


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TO RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY

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RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR

VAIHINGEN GE

PRIORITY



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RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR

VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY

RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC

MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC

PRIORITY

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

PRIORITY

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

PRIORITY



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SERIAL: (U)

(b)(3):10 USC 424

COUNTRY: (U) GHANA (GH); NIGERIA (NI); SENEGAL (SG);
BURUNDI (BY); KENYA (KE); SOUTH AFRICA (SF); TANZANIA
(TZ).

(b)(3):10 USC 424

SUBJ: ASSESSMENT OF BURUNDI
PEACEKEEPING PLAN (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 20011015.

(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(3):50 USC
3024(i)(5)(c):1-4(c)

SOURCE: (U)

SUMMARY: (C)

HIGHLIGHTS SEVERAL
PROBLEMS WITH THE PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING
FORCE FOR BURUNDI. GHANA ARMY PARTICIPATION IS
UNLIKELY UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

TEXT: 1. (C)

(b)(1):Sec 1.4(c)

SEVERAL PROBLEMS WITH THE
PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE FOR BURUNDI.
CHIEF AMONG THESE PROBLEMS IS THE FACT THAT THE PEACE
AGREEMENT AMONG WARRING FACTIONS HAS YET TO BE PROPERLY
PACKAGED. THE METHOD AGREED TO
FOR PUTTING IN THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT LEAVES A LOT
TO BE DESIRED. IN ADDITION TO FLAWS HE SEES IN THE
TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENT,
THE GENERAL LEVEL OF INSECURITY IN THE COUNTRY REMAINS
TOO HIGH FOR A TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE.

(b)(1):Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1):Sec 1.4(c)

2. (C)

(b)(1):Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

(b)(1) Sec. 1 4(c)

FORWARD FOR AN INTERNATIONAL BURUNDI PEACEKEEPING FORCE. CHAIRED BY FORMER SOUTH AFRICAN PRESIDENT NELSON ((MANDELA)), THE SOUTH AFRICA CONFERENCE ALSO HAD DELEGATIONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA, NIGERIA, AND SENEGAL. IN ADDITION, BURUNDI, TANZANIA, AND KENYA WERE REPRESENTED AT THE MEETINGS.

(b)(1) Sec. 1 4(c)

3. (C) [REDACTED] VARIOUS COURSES OF ACTION WERE DISCUSSED AND EACH DELEGATION VOICED MANY CONCERNS DURING MARATHON MEETINGS THAT LASTED AS LONG AS 14 HOURS. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE, MANDELA ISSUED A COMMUNIQUE ON THE CONFERENCE RESULTS, WHICH,

(b)(1) Sec. 1 4(c)

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SERIAL: (U) [REDACTED]
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(TZ).

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SUBJ: [REDACTED] ASSESSMENT OF BURUNDI
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REPRESENTED THE VIEWS OF THE PARTIES TO THE
CONFERENCE.)

(b)(1) Sec. 1 4(c)

4. (C) [REDACTED] THE CONFERENCE "SETTLED"
ON A COURSE OF ACTION IN WHICH, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF
A CEASEFIRE, THE BURUNDI TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD
TAKE EFFECT ON 1 NOVEMBER. UNDER THIS COURSE OF
ACTION, 250 TROOPS FROM OUTSIDE OF BURUNDI WOULD COME
TO SERVE AS A PROTECTION FORCE FOR BURUNDI POLITICIANS.
THE TROOPS, UNDER A SIX-MONTH INITIAL MANDATE, WOULD
SERVE UNDER THE BURUNDI ARMED FORCES COMMANDER.

5. (C) [REDACTED] THE
"SETTLED" COURSE OF ACTION VIOLATES ALL KNOWN
PRINCIPLES OF NEUTRALITY AND IMPARTIALITY INHERENT IN
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS. THE BURUNDI ARMED FORCES
COMMANDER IS AN INTERESTED PARTY IN THE BURUNDI
CONFLICT. [REDACTED] CANNOT IMAGINE THAT THE BURUNDI
ARMED FORCES COMMANDER, A TUTSI, CAN IMPARTIALLY DIRECT
THE PROTECTION OF HUTU POLITICIANS. THEREFORE, A
NEUTRAL FORCE SHOULD NOT LOGICALLY FALL UNDER THE
BURUNDI ARMED FORCES COMMANDER'S AUTHORITY. BY FALLING
UNDER THE COMMAND OF AN INTERESTED PARTY, THE
PEACEKEEPING FORCE LOSES ITS IMPARTIAL STATUS IN THE
EYES OF OTHER (INTERESTED) PARTIES.

(b)(1) Sec. 1 4(c)

(b)(1) Sec. 1 4(c)

(b)(1) Sec. 1 4(c)

6. (C) [REDACTED] COMMAND AND CONTROL IS A
CRITICAL ISSUE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE.
THE FORCE COMMANDER MUST HAVE THE AUTHORITY AND ABILITY

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

TO MOVE AND DEPLOY ELEMENTS AS HE SEES FIT IN AN IMPARTIAL MANNER. THE BURUNDI PEACEKEEPING FORCE WILL HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO TRAIN BURUNDI MILITARY PERSONNEL, BUT WHO WILL THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE BE TRAINING? UNDER THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENT, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT BURUNDIANS TRAINED BY THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE WILL HAVE BEEN SELECTED IN AN IMPARTIAL MANNER.

[REDACTED] (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c)

7. (C) ANOTHER PROBLEM WITH THE CURRENT PLAN FOR AN INITIAL INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE IS ITS SIZE, WHICH WAS DETERMINED TO BE 250. THIS SIZE FORCE IS FAR TOO SMALL FOR THE SIZE AND CURRENT LEVEL OF INSECURITY IN BURUNDI. [REDACTED] THE PLAN ONLY ADDRESSES PROTECTION OF POLITICIANS IN URBAN AREAS, BUT NEGLECTS THE FACT THAT CIVIL WAR CONTINUES IN THE COUNTRYSIDE (AND IS ENCROACHING ON URBAN AREAS).

ACCRA GH

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SERIAL: (U) [REDACTED] (b)(3), 10 USC 424

COUNTRY: (U) GHANA (GH); NIGERIA (NI); SENEGAL (SG); BURUNDI (BY); KENYA (KE); SOUTH AFRICA (SF); TANZANIA (TZ). (b)(3), 10 USC 424

[REDACTED] ASSESSMENT OF BURUNDI

PEACEKEEPING PLAN (U)

8. (C) YET ANOTHER PROBLEM WITH THE PLAN DISCUSSED IN SOUTH AFRICA IS THE SIX-MONTH MANDATE. IT MAKES NO SENSE TO PLA FOR A SIX-MONTH FORCE DEPLOYMENT WHILE THE PLANNED DURATION FOR THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT IS EIGHTEEN MONTHS.

[REDACTED] (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c)

[REDACTED] GHANA WILL "WAIT AND SEE" HOW THE SITUATION DEVELOPS. HOWEVER, PERHAPS AN EVEN MORE IMPORTANT REASON THAT [REDACTED] CANNOT SUPPORT DEPLOYMENT OF A GHANAIAN FORCE TO BURUNDI IS BECAUSE THE GHANA ARMY IS OVERSTRETCHED. (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c)

[REDACTED] (b)(3), 10 USC 424

[REDACTED] (b)(3), 10 USC 424

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

"SLEDGEHAMMER" APPROACH IN HIS ROLE AS THE PRINCIPAL MEDIATOR TO THE BURUNDI CONFLICT. MANDELA VIEWS THE SITUATION IN BURUNDI LIKE A STICK IN WATER. EVEN THOUGH EVERYBODY KNOWS THAT THE STICK IS STRAIGHT AND RIGID, MANDELA CLAIMS THE STICK IS BENT AND FLEXIBLE BECAUSE THAT IS THE WAY THE STICK APPEARS TO THE EYE.

(a)(1); Sec. 1.4(c)

MANDELA HAS PUBLICLY HUMILIATED BURUNDI'S PRESIDENT ((BUYOYA)), RANTING THAT BUYOYA IS UNDEMOCRATIC, RATHER THAN SIMPLY ACCEPTING THE REALITY THAT BUYOYA IS A MAJOR PLAYER (WITH WHOM TO BE RECKONED).

(c)(1); Sec. 1.4(c)

11. (C) THE RESULTS OF AN INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT TEAM THAT CONCLUDED ITS MISSION IN BURUNDI IN OCTOBER WERE DISCOURAGING. BURUNDIAN PEOPLE, ACCORDING TO THE TEAM FINDINGS, DON'T UNDERSTAND WHAT THE PEACE PLAN IS ALL ABOUT. THEY ARE CONFUSED BY THE MULTITUDE OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND MOVEMENTS. THEY DON'T UNDERSTAND WHY AN INTERNATIONAL MILITARY FORCE SHOULD ONLY PROTECT POLITICIANS IN THE CAPITAL, BUT LEAVE THE REST OF THE COUNTRY RAVAGED BY FIGHTING.

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(a)(1); (a)(3); 10 USC 424; Sec. 1.4(c)

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